April 1994: Rwanda, a little country in Central Africa, is propelled to the forefront of the international stage. It is the site of the greatest genocide in African history, the genocide of the Rwandans, who in three months suffered between 500,000 and 800,000 deaths. Hutu militias were principally responsible for the massacres. This explosion of violence began the morning of 7 April 1994, following the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a movement of Tutsi exiles fighting against the authority of Habyarimana since 1 October 1990, was accused of the murder. This assassination occurred in a context of extreme tension between the two principal ethnic groups of the country, the Hutu and the Tutsi, which made the tragedy of the genocide possible. Despite the appalling images appearing on television, the international community did little to stop the horror; the 2,500 UN peacekeepers stationed in the country since 1993 stood by and watched without lifting a finger to stop the massacres.

On 7 April, while the massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were beginning, the RPF took advantage of the chaos to resume the civil war which had been ostensibly halted by the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in August 1993. In its wake, the RPF left thousands of dead Hutu men, women and children. No journalist spoke of this because the RPF prohibited access to the places where the massacres were being committed. In July 1994, the RPF took power in Kigali and intensified the massacre of the Hutus who remained in Rwanda. In a statement made public in December 1995 after his defection, former RPF intelligence chief Sixbert Musanamfura alleged that 312,726 people were murdered in a selective and deliberate fashion between July 1994 and July 1995.1 A November 1995 statement by ex-Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu corroborated reports of massacres by the RPF above and beyond those reported by the international media, citing "irrefutable proof" that 200,000 people were killed.

When the RPF took power, several million Hutus took refuge in neighboring countries. More than a million of them gathered in camps around the cities of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In October 1996, the RPF invaded the DRC and destroyed refugee camps. Thousands of Hutus were killed during these attacks; others had to re-enter Rwanda, while still others found refuge in the mountains and forests of the Congo. The RPF and its allies followed this last group all the way to Mbandaka, a town 2,000 kilometers from Bukavu. Approximately 200,000 Hutu refugees were killed in this pursuit.2 The massacres of the Hutu refugees in the DRC were described by independent and UN committees of inquiry as "acts of genocide."3

Since the end of the war in July 1994, reconciliation has become a priority for many Rwandans and some international organizations. Some initiatives to prepare the Hutu and Tutsi populations for reconciliation have been taken, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the creation of the Gacaca tribunals, the removal of ethnic designation from identity cards, the construction of a statement of the case on genocide and the institution of an indemnity fund for victims of the genocide. Until now these initiatives have been concerned only with crimes committed by Hutus and only with Tutsi victims. The crimes committed by the RPF are being largely ignored, and the Hutu victims of the genocide and its aftermath have been nearly forgotten.4 Faced with this situation, opponents of the Kagame regime, as well as certain experts, think that such initiatives not only fail to contribute to reconciliation, but also create frustrations among Hutus and consequently enlarge the gap that exists between the two ethnic groups. What the Hutu-Tutsi conflict is really about and what initiatives taken for ethnic group reconciliation have really achieved is what we will see in the following pages.

THE HUTU-TUTSI CONFLICT THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF RWANDA

Rwanda has been populated since the 8th century B.C. by the Batwa, a pygmy population who lived principally by hunting and gathering. Bahutu farmers and Batutsi herders moved in progressively between the 10th and 11th centuries. Starting in the 16th century, the region became organized into kingdoms. The Bami (kings) were both Bahutu and Batutsi. One of the Tutsis, scion of the dynasty of the Banyiginyas, finally unified the country under one rule. To reinforce its power, the Banyiginya dynasty built a state with a central administration, using customary Tutsi authority to manage the territory. In order to maintain good alliances with the Tutsi chiefs, the colonialists did not alter any of their privileges; rather, they reinforced these privileges by creating schools for the chiefs and integrating them into the colonial administration.

Starting in the 1950s, Hutu intellectuals began to question Tutsi domination and demand basic reforms. The King’s refusal to consider the claims of the Hutu leaders ended in the social revolution of 1959, which involved the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic in which the Hutu dominated government institutions. In 1960, the former government of King Kigeli V Ndahindurwa, along with more than 200,000 Tutsis, left the country for Uganda and other neighboring countries. Starting in 1962, the Tutsi exiles organized themselves and began to attack Rwanda in an attempt to retake power. These attacks were followed by a massacre of Tutsis, perpetrated in the interior of the country by Hutus. The new democracy, gained with the sacrifice of so many human lives, would not last long: The power of President Grégoire Kayibanda was reinforced by slowly excluding and marginalizing politicians from other regions of the country and those who did not speak the same language he did. In 1973, soldiers from the north under the command of General Juvenal Habyarimana carried out a coup and deposed Kayibanda. He and his closest collaborators were thrown into prison where they were subsequently assassinated. The Habyarimana military regime did not reestablish democracy; it simply replaced the Hutu dictatorship from Giterama with a Hutu dictatorship from the north.

On 1 October 1990, Tutsi refugees who had organized under the name of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) during the 1980s attacked Rwanda from Uganda. This attack was accomplished by massacres of people living in communities along the border with Uganda, the ma-
ority of the victims being Hutus. Although Human Rights Watch reports that there is currently no credible evidence implicating the RPF in large-scale massacres, many former residents of Byumba and Ruhengeri—
including this author-report villages being attacked and having had friends and family members killed, often in brutal fashion. Lieutenant Abdul Ruzibiza, an RPF dissident, has described the manner in which these people were killed: "The people were tied up, arms attached to legs. Then they broke their heads with an old hoe and stuck knives in their ribs until they were dead."6 Chased off their land by the civil war with the RPF, farmers found refuge in the displaced persons camps where they lived under inhumane conditions. Despite the war, under pressure from the international community, President , Habyarimana accepted multiparty rule in 1991. The main parties, which were organized around ethnic and regional lines, included Habyarimana's National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), composed mostly of Hutus from the North; the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), led by former president Kayibanda; and composed mostly of Hutus from Gitarama and Kibuye; the Social Democratic Party (PSD), composed mostly of Hutus from Butare and Gikongoro; and the Liberal Party (PL), composed mostly of Tutsis. The PSD, MDR and LP constituted the Rajco of the Habyarimana regime. Employing confrontational strategies, these different parties formed militias comprised mainly of disaffected youth. The militia of the MRND was called the Interahamwe, which would later become the principal participant in the genocide.

During 1992 there were essentially two political camps: Habyarimana and his mostly northern Hutu allies, and the RPF and its primarily southern Hutu allies. In February 1993, the RPF broke a ceasefire agreement and pushed deeper into Rwanda; parallel to the guerilla war, it also carried out several targeted assassinations of Hutu leaders.7 This new RPF offensive led certain Hutu members of the opposition to pronounce the alliance of their parties with the RPF, whom they began to suspect of wanting to monopolize power to the exclusion of all Hutus. The democratic opposition fractured into those who remained pro-RPF and those who leaned toward Habyarimana. By this time, the number of persons displaced by the war was estimated at one million, gathered in makeshift camps around Kigali. Pressure from the international community brought the Rwandan government and the RPF to the negotiating table, and a peace accord was signed on July 2, 1993. Hutus generally considered the Arusha accords to have handed a victory to the RPF, who effectively obtained 50 percent of the officer corps and 40 percent of all personnel in a new Rwandan army.

On 21 October 1993, the democratically elected Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated by soldiers of Burundi's Tutsi-dominated armed forces. On 23 October, a meeting of political parties was organized in Kigali to denounce the assassination. During this meeting, Karamira Froduald, second vice-president of the MDR, accused the RPF and in particular its leader, Paul Kagame, being involved in the assassination and seeking to seize power in Rwanda in a similar fashion. It was during this meeting that the concept of "Hutu Power" was first invoked. The political class of Rwanda became divided into two primarily ethnic-based blocs: the side of Habyarimana and the majority of Hutus, and the side of the RPF, comprised of the Tutsis and some Hutu members of the opposition. These two blocs proceeded to engage in a media war, each attempting to mobilize their troops for a final confrontation.

On 6 April 1994, in the early evening, the plane bringing President Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart back from a meeting of regional heads of state in Tanzania was shot down as it began its descent into Kigali International Airport. French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere and various RPF dissidents have argued that this attack, which cost the life of President Habyarimana and threw the country into chaos, was planned by the RPF.8 In Kigali, the Presidential Guard began assassinating Tutsis and moderate Hutu political opponents of the Habyarimana regime, and massacres of Tutsis and of Hutus suspected of being Tutsis or Tutsi allies were carried out by militia without distinction. As the days passed, the massacres spread to all the regions of the country. For three months, Tutsis and Hutus families allied to the RPF were hunted down as if they were pests. The UN estimates that between 500,000 and 800,000 persons were killed by the Interahamwe, 90 percent of whom were Tutsi.

' On the day after the assassination of President Habyarimana, the RPF resumed its guerilla war. It also carried out massacres of Hutu populations in areas under its control.9 On 4 July 1994, the city of Kigali fell into the hands of the RPF. As mentioned above, despite the existence of a Hutu president and several Hutu ministers, the RPF is accused of carrying out massacres of Hutus who remained in Rwanda. Some justified these massacres by the desire for vengeance among the soldiers who returned to find that their families had been exterminated during the genocide. However, when one reads the testimony of Abdul Ruzibiza, as well and that of other former-RPF dissidents, these acts do not seem to be isolated. To the contrary, it seems that these massacres were planned in advance and that special units had been created by the RPF high command to carry them out and then make all traces of them disappear. Ruzibiza states:

The task of systematically massacring the population was assigned to one category of soldiers, specially chosen and trained under the supervision of executioners who played the role of intelligence officers and intelligence staff or of political commissars in the army. This did not prevent the specialists in murder from several times appealing to a company to support the operations of burial, loading, incineration, or concealing the bodies. It all depended on the importance of the group killed or about to be killed. Often several companies were called on. Such operations, however, were increasingly rare as each military unit had its own special company or its own special squad. One company of this type often counted more than 200 men, and a squad had more than 100 men, operating under the supervision of intelligence officers and political commissars."

After the resumption of the war in April 1994 and the takeover of power by the RPF, millions of Hutus fled the country, finding refuge in neighboring countries where they were put into refugee camps. More than a million Hutus were put into camps around the cities of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira in the current Democratic Republic of the Congo. The number of Hutu refugees was so large that, from the very beginning, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees thought of repatriating them as quickly as possible. In July 1994, it appointed Robert Gersony, an American expert, to evaluate the state of security and of respect for human rights in Rwanda after the RPF takeover, with a view toward repatriating the refugees. He concluded in his report that the unsafe situation prevailing in the

"Is Reconciliation Between Hutu and Tutsi Possible?"

U.M. Beatrice, *Journal of International Affairs"
country did not favor a mass repatriation of Hutu refugees in neighboring countries because of the terror and the large-scale collective massacres committed by the RPF against the civilian populations remaining in Rwanda. The Gersony report then made an inventory of more than 30,000 Hutu victims killed by the troops of the Rwandan Patriotic Army in two months in just three of Rwanda’s ten regions. Unfortunately for the refugees, this report was not made public; it was withdrawn from circulation by the secretary-general of the United Nations at the request of the Americans.12 However, its publication would have allowed the international community to realize that most of the refugees were resisting repatriation because they feared for their lives—not because they had been taken hostage by the militias or by former officials. In October and November 1996, the RPF army attacked with heavy weapons and destroyed the refugee camps in the eastern DRC. Pursued by them and by Laurent Kabila’s soldiers, between 400,000 and 500,000 refugees were forced to plunge further into the interior of the DRC across the humid equatorial forest.13 For over 2,000 kilometers from Bukavu to Mbandaka, the Congolese forest is strewn with mass graves of refugees murdered by their pursuers, often under atrocious conditions. Maurice Niwese, formerly a student at the National University of Rwanda and an escapee from the massacres at Kasese, near Kisangani, relates: We started to settle down along the railroad track and to search for something to eat....In front of us the soldiers who were guiding us set up with their machine guns and their boxes of shells. They turned their canons on us. There were also many of them that they were everywhere. Mercilessly, they opened fire. People died in the hundreds. Blood was running everywhere; it mixed in with the food they were preparing, and everything turned red....Near me, my parents, friends, neighbors fell....The killings lasted three days. The second and third days, the soldiers pursued us into the forest. They looked at the bodies to see if anyone was still breathing. In the forest, any man caught was immediately killed. As for the women, they were taken away. One woman who escaped told me afterwards that they were savagely raped. Then they killed them. The soldiers put their rifle barrels into their genitals to shoot. This testimony was confirmed by the bodies of women that we later found. After the third day, trucks began to take them to continue. They burned the bodies all along the railway. This operation preceded the arrival of the humanitarian workers.14 Maurice Niwese survived the Kasese massacres because he was able to run and hide in the forest. Others, especially women, children, old people and the sick, did not have the same chance he had. In November 1997, the African Association for the Protection of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ASADHO) and the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (CIDPDD) initiated an international non-governmental commission to shed light on the allegations of humanrights violations that occurred in the DRC during the war. The commission issued a report in June 1998 in which one may read: The overwhelming evidence from the testimonies of survivors, missionaries, employees of non-governmental organizations (NGO), and certain local journalists confirms the extermination of the “Hutu refugees” (Rwandan and Burundian) by the Banya-  

mulenge rebels supported by the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian armies. The massacres were perpetrated in a concerted, planned, systematic, and methodical manner and were motivated by ethnic hatred. They were killed by automatic weapons and knives; they bombarded the camps; they tortured, raped the women, and deliberately deprived them of any food, medicine, or water... All the means were aimed at the objective of the total annihilation of this population considered in opposition to the regimes in place in Kigali and Bujumbura...The committee estimates on the basis of numerous reports and testimonies that support the allegations that close to 200,000 refugees, most of them Hutus, died on Zairean soil in an arbitrary fashion, or else disappeared as the consequence of a deliberate strategy of slow extermination of a portion of the Rwandan population. To do this, means which strongly resemble genocidal acts were used with premeditation in a steady and persistent manner. The perpetrators did not recoil from any means to attain their objective of eliminating the Hutu refugees: direct massacres, pushing the refugees into inhospitable places where they could be killed slowly by disease or poor climatic conditions, obstructing humanitarian assistance, and using the humanitarian organizations to trap the refugees. In the opinion of the committee, this deliberate intention was then characterized by a firm official desire to assure impunity by cleaning up the sites where the massacres took place....On this basis, the committee is of the opinion that acts of genocide were committed in Zaire against the Hutu refugees in violation of the Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide adopted on December 1948 and ratified by Zaire. Despite the involvement of the Kagame regime in the massacres, the UN and the rest of the international community prefer to shut their eyes. Certain countries, such as the United States, have even gone so far as to applaud the regime in Kigali’s efforts to “strengthen civilian and military justice systems.”15 Many observers and researchers think that the international community has been generous to Kagame and his government because they feel guilty for not having intervened to stop the genocide of the Tutsis in 1994. For me, the responsibility cannot be the only explanation for the attitude of the international community, especially since it supported the RPF even before the genocide of the Tutsis took place. The defense of the economic and strategic interests of the great powers who control the UN, especially the United States and France, was taken into account if one wishes to understand the way in which the case of Rwanda-and the Great Lakes region-has been managed by the UN, the European Union and Western countries.

3.2 "Is Reconciliation Between Hutu and Tutsi Possible?"
U.M. Beatrice, Journal of International Affairs

Page 3
Rwanda and throughout the entire Great Lakes region. Before beginning any reflection on progress toward real reconciliation among Rwandans, however, it is important first to agree on this concept: What do we mean by the term "reconciliation"?

Based on the definition given by Joseph Ma’ila, director of the Center for Research on Peace and the Institute for Training in Mediation and Negotiation, and by Professor William Zartman, one may say that reconciliation is a complex process the end result of which is to allow people in conflict to arrive at a pacified society where free and equal individuals acknowledge each other and are capable of facing up to a history full of violent acts, and above all, are able to surmount that history.17 As a process, reconciliation advances in several stages. In the first stage, the recognition that the conflict is over is completed for true reconciliation:

* The reexamination of memory and the writing of history in which the various categories of the Rwandan population (ethnic and regional) are acknowledged.
* The construction of a justice system that recognizes the rights and obligations of all Rwandans, regardless of ethnicity, religion, region, or sex.
* The formation of identities in the framework of greater solidarity and cooperation.
* The establishment of political conditions for a genuine reconciliation.
* Indemnification for all victims.

TO REEXAMINE MEMORY AND TO WRITE A HISTORY IN WHICH ALL CATEGORIES OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION ARE RECOGNIZED

Hutus and Tutsis often hold different interpretations of Rwandan history. For example, the Kagame regime says the Europeans introduced ethnic groups into Rwanda, while the Hutus maintain that the ethnic groups existed before the arrival of the colonizers, even if the latter reinforced the differences that existed among them. Pre-colonial Rwanda is presented by the RPF ideologues and their allies as a world without conflict, where all the different groups lived in harmony. For the Hutu, the socioeconomic and political system of pre-colonial Rwanda was based on the exploitation of the masses—mainly the Hutus. Such a society could hardly be free of conflict. The 1959 revolution is seen by Tutsis as the beginning of genocide; for the Hutus, this was the act that liberated them from the Tutsi yoke. These few examples illustrate the difficulty of writing a history in which Hutus and Tutsis acknowledge one another. However, it is important that all sides overcome their hatred and fears to construct together a history that relates the facts and draws out the consequences, not only for each group, but even more so for the various groups to live together. No doubt it will be difficult to have a consensus on all historical questions, but the organization of a true debate will allow them to tackle the controversies together with a view toward constructing a joint vision.

TO IMPLEMENT A SYSTEM OF JUSTICE THAT RECOGNIZES THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ALL RWANDANS

In July 1994, when the RPF took power, the war, the genocide against the Tutsis, the massacres of Hutu populations and the exile of hundreds of thousands of others had destroyed the Rwandan judicial system. The existing infrastructure had been destroyed; the judges and the judicial personnel who had not been killed were again in exile. In these conditions, to render justice with strict respect for the law was difficult, even impossible. At least these were the reasons advanced by the Rwandan government to explain the arbitrary arrests and the militarization of the judiciary. Twelve years after the genocide, where is the Rwandan government in instituting an equitable justice system for all? In 1996, a law relating to the repression of the genocide was passed.18 Unfortunately, it recognized only the crimes perpetrated against the Tutsi. Yet, as we have already seen, hundreds of thousands of Hutus were also victims of the massacres in Rwanda and in the Congo. Some of these massacres were even categorized by the international committee of inquiry as acts of genocide.

The most important reform of the judicial system, however, remains the institution of the Gacaca popular courts. The principal objectives of these popular courts are to shed light on the accused perpetrators of the genocide, to erase the culture of impunity and to reconcile Rwandans with one another and reinforce national unity. To become a real tool for the reconciliation of the Rwandans, these popular courts have to be accepted by everyone to express their own ideas of the truth in order to arrive at a truth accepted by everyone. However, as long as courts of law continue to try only the persons presumed to be guilty of genocide against the Tutsis, the Hutu-many of whom lost many family members during the conflict or have family members currently in prison, arrested with no proof just because they are Hutus or were denounced unjustly—will be frustrated. This might lead Hutus to create a bloc and not denounce their own who participated in the genocide. Other weaknesses in these popular courts appeared once they began to function. For example, in certain jurisdictions where the majority of judges are Hutus, the trials involve survivors and judges who only want to hear confessions from people who did not necessarily commit crimes. If the defendants deny the charges, they return to prison. There have been trials in which Hutus who saved Tutsis while risking their own lives are returned to prison because they did not want to admit to crimes which they did not commit. Those whom they saved often are afraid to give evidence in their favor, fearing they will be accused of complicity with those who committed the genocide. In the court jurisdictions where the survivors are in the minority, they do not dare charge the criminals because they are afraid of being persecuted, marginalized or even murdered.

With the Gacaca, the Kagame regime hopes that justice will be done in a way that will eradicate the culture of impunity, which, according to the government, began with the amnesty law promulgated by the First Republic on 20 May 1963 with regard to those who were found guilty of massacres of Tutsis in 1959. This impunity continued under the Habyarimana regime, which prosecuted neither those guilty of assassinations of Tutsis in 1973 nor of the massacres which followed attacks by the RPF, notably in Kibiliara, Gisenyi, Bugesera and Mubara. However, in not judging the Tutsis who had innocent Hutus killed or imprisoned by denouncing them as genocidal killers, the Kagame regime is perpetuating the impunity for which it reproached the Hutu regimes which preceded it. In so doing, it is reinforcing in the minds of Rwandans who whatever power has all rights, even that of murder.

TO LAY OUT THESE RIGHTS AND IDENTITIES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF GREATER SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION

3.2

"Is Reconciliation Between Hutu and Tutsi Possible?"

U.M. Beatrice, Journal of International Affairs

Page 4
History, myths and proverbs show that ethnic groups existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, but that conflicts were not always ethnic in origin. However, ethnicity was the source of conflict in the case of the Rucunshu coup d'état and the massacres of the Banyiginya by the Bega clan, all of whom were Tutsis. These conflicts were due to the exclusion of other clans, regions and ethnic groups from the exercise of power. In excluding and persecuting all those who were not on the same side, the successive regimes in Rwanda created and fostered the resentments that led to their eventual fall. Despite its discourse of reconciliation, dialogue and peace, the Kagame regime is behaving in the same manner as its predecessors. If it remains on this path, it will come to the same end as the Banyiginya monarchy and the Hutu regimes which preceded it by organizing massacres of Hutus. The system has always been dominated by one clan, ethnic group or region to the detriment of others. When the clans, ethnic groups or regions excluded from power challenge the system, the system has always responded with the persecution, imprisonment and assassination of its opponents. Like Kayibanda in 1961 and Habyarimana in 1973, the ICaregime regime had a chance to change this state of affairs in July 1994 when the RPF took power, but it did not take it. Indeed, it perpetuated the tradition of the regimes which preceded it by organizing massacres of Hutu populations in Rwanda and in the DRC, and by imprisoning more than a hundred thousand others; by assassinating and forcing Hutu and moderate Tutsi politicians into exile; and by transforming the country into a military dictatorship that even Tutsis like Sarenzeni Joseph Kabuyi, speaker of the national assembly, fled.

After what we have just seen, to believe the Kagame regime can create the conditions necessary for a genuine reconciliation to take Rwanda along this path would be a Utopian thought. As a possible way to go, the Concertation Permanente de l’Opposition Démocratique Rwandaise (COPORD), which includes the majority of Hutu and Tutsi opponents of the Kagame regime, advocates for the organization of an inter-Rwandan dialogue in which all social and political forces would participate.21 This dialogue would permit reflection on the history, the current socioeconomic and political situation, and the future of Rwanda. “This is the only condition in which they could define the mainstays of a constitution and set in place a renewed institutional cadre which would preserve cohesion and further national reconciliation.”22 The important objectives that would be brought up on the occasion of such a dialogue would include the following:

- The division of power among the different socio-political-economic groups, without forgetting women, youth and farmers who continue to be the forgotten ones in the political debate in Rwanda. The principle we inherited from the colonial period of “one man, one vote” needs to be replaced by setting up institutions in which all categories of the Rwandan population can be acknowledged.
- The setting up of a genuine process of democratization—one which gives the people the power to make decisions and which respects pluralism. * The participation of civil society in public debate and a guarantee of freedom of expression. * The indemnification of victims without distinction. * The establishment of an equitable justice that will allow for the eradication of the culture of impunity. * The reduction of the prison population, especially by accelerating the liberation of prisoners held without charges. * The writing of a history in which the different ethnic and regional groups in the country are acknowledged. * The institution of mechanisms which allow for the eradication of a culture of violence in Rwandan society.

This project is possible only if the international community stops supporting Kagame’s rule unconditionally and stops pointing to it as a model of democracy for all of Africa. If the UN and Western countries were able to persuade Habyarimana to accept democratic reforms and were able to compel him to the negotiating table at Arusha, they can also get Kagame to accept the inter-Rwandan dialogue. It would also be necessary for the great powers to be interested in the reconciliation of Rwandans and in the return of peace to Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. Ultimately, the stabilization and democratization of Africa is in their own interests. The civil societies of these countries should pressure their governments to make an opening to democracy and a greater respect for individual rights conditions for their aid to Rwanda.

**INDEMNIFICATION FOR THE VICTIMS**

An equitable justice entails indemnification for victims. It is in this framework that a Survivors of Genocide Fund (FARG) has existed in Rwanda since 1998.

[The fund] is oriented to the some 300,000 Tutsi survivors judged needy on the basis of the 1996 census. This fund, whose management has become the object of a very critical parliamentary report, represents about 15 million dollars a year, paid by the state for essentials. Since 1998, the government has devoted less than five percent of its annual regular budget to FARG, about 11 million dollars. Parliament has just proposed, on 13 June (2006) to increase this amount to twelve percent.

3.2 "Is Reconciliation Between Hutu and Tutsi Possible?"  
U.M. Beatrice, *Journal of International Affairs*  
Page 5
While it even pays the school fees of Tutsi children in areas that did not experience genocide (the buffer zone, for example), the Hutu children whose parents were killed during the genocide because they were considered pro-RPF receive no assistance at all. For the victims of the RPF, the situation is much more problematic since the state does not accord them the status of victims. This situation engenders resentment, frustration and rancor among the Hutu population. For indemnification to be a means for national reconciliation, all victims-Hutu and Tutsi-must be taken into account. Community projects identified by all the population should be financed. The farmers in the hills, who best understand what they need most, should be a majority on the management committee of the fund set up for this area. International organizations like the UNDP and the European Union should provide money for this fund, in the same way that great powers like the United States, France, Canada, Great Britain and others do. Considering the detrimental role played by these latter in the Rwandan tragedy, their participation in the indemnification of victims is a chance to redeem themselves.

CONCLUSION

After the genocide of the Tutsis in April 1994 and the massacres of Hutus in Rwanda and the DRC, reconciliation among Rwandans is a great challenge, both for the Rwandans desirous of peace and for the international community. Many initiatives have been taken by the Rwandan government, international organizations and the UN to bring Hutus and Tutsi along the road to reconciliation. Yet these various initiatives have the same failing: They do not broach the Rwandan question in its totality. Alternatives like the organization of an inter-Rwandan dialogue have been proposed by Rwandans, both Hutu and Tutsi, and by other people interested in the return of peace to the Great Lakes region. Unfortunately, the Kagame government has not chosen to pursue such a dialogue. On the international scene, the Kagame regime has the unconditional support of the United States, which reinforces Kagame’s political position not only within Rwanda but throughout the Great Lakes region. Other Western countries and the European Union have followed in the footsteps of the United States and continue to support the regime unconditionally.

Kagame’s political opponents and other democratic forces find themselves at an impasse. In such a situation, the reaction in the past has always been the same-people take up arms to make themselves heard. The creation of armed movements that ally with political opposition abroad represents a logic of violence that risks sweeping away the logic of peace and reconciliation. Most Rwandans, Hutu and Tutsi, will once again pay with their lives for the thirst for power of a military dictatorship which has been imposed on them. Alone, without any real power to change the situation, they have no choice but to wait. Still, organizations for the defense of human rights, along with the other organizations from Western countries working for peace and reconciliation, can contribute enormously to helping the Rwandans out of this impasse.